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MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS IN LOGISTICS
A. INTRODUCTION
A measure of effectiveness (MOE) is an objective, quantitative expression of
performance appropriate to the context in which it is being used. Generally a
MOE is an expression that relates resources input to obtain a given measure of
output. Return on investment or miles per gallon are possible MOEs for the
performance of a firm or automobile respectively. MOEs can also relate solely
to output measures; tons of shipping which arrives safely at its destination, for
instance.
To be legitimate, the MOE must have real scales on which to measure inputs
and outputs. For the firm both investment and return are naturally measured in
dollars and return on investment is simply their ratio. For the automobile both
miles and gallons can be objectively measured, though on different scales. The
challenge in most situations is the measurement of the input, output or both. Cost
effectiveness or "bang per buck" is an attractive and frequently used MOE.
However while cost is usually measured in dollars, effectiveness is more difficult
to characterize and measure. Return on investment may be useful to describe
how the assets of a charitable foundation are managed, but this MOE is not useful
to characterize the operations or programs of the foundation; programs may
include the support of young artists or the purchase of land for preserving open
space for example. One can measure the resources consumed but how should the
outputs (activities supported) be characterized? The defense of the country can be
characterized in terms of inputs (costs), but how should the output be measured?
Defense is purposeful but not inherently economic in nature. Still in
peacetime, which thankfully is most of the time, economics dominate all decisions
in defense. This is a fact of life as all resources (dollars, manpower, other) are
finite and therefore must be explicitly allocated. Nonetheless the quest for
reasonable output measures and therefore MOEs is an important on-going
problem.
Notice also that MOEs in the affairs of man and society tend to be relative
rather than absolute. There is no best return on investment (unless on wants to
think that an infinite rate is best) and companies may be judged against the norms
for their industry. The classical question in defense is "how much defense is
enough?" The answer is relative rather than absolute. It is also a question which
is political rather than analytical in nature; analysis helps but fundamentally
cannot provide the answer.
While such global questions as how much defense is enough are
unanswerable, MOEs are useful in more limited decisions such as the choice
between alternative capital investment projects or weapon systems or how a given
process should be controlled (physical distribution for example). The above
introduces a few of the primary issues associated with MOEs in general. Interest
here is limited to MOEs for logistics, specifically naval logistics and, even more
narrowly, combat logistics (to be defined subsequently).
B. LOGISTICS
"Logistic" is from the Greek logistikos meaning skilled in calculation.
Further Webster's defines logistics as the branch of military science having to do
with moving, supplying, and quartering troops. These definitions imply that
logistics involves the care and feeding of combat forces and is supported by
significant amounts of calculation; calculation of requirements whether they be
transport, bullets or beans.
Before focusing on military logistics it is useful to note some of the
characteristics of material logistics systems in the private sector. One textbook
on the subject, Ref(l), defines business logistics as physical distribution, materials
management, and logistics engineering with the foregoing involving the activities
of transport, storage, packaging, materials handling, order processing,
forecasting, production planning, purchasing, inventory control, and site
location. Within a given firm the logistics system is designed to accommodate the
steady-state, current situation. One hopes always for greater volumes or new
markets but the business logistics system is largely sized to current operations.
Blood banks are about the only case where the system is structured to
accommodate operations levels above the steady-state level; e.g., disasters.
Another characteristic of business logistics systems is that requirements are
predictable and the locations at which the requirements are generated, both
within and outside the firm, are known. In commercial firms such as Safeway,
Texaco, Federal Express, or Sears an approach to logistics management is to set
product availability or service levels and then minimize the cost of the logistics
system which provides these performance levels. This approach avoids the need
to estimate stockout costs or failure to meet due dates. An option in business
logistics systems is to contract for parts of the system. Britain's largest
department store chain, Marks & Spencer, contracts for its entire physical
distribution system.
Military logistics systems differ in important ways. For the military,
peacetime is the steady-state and while economics would dictate the minimum
cost system which adequately supports peacetime requirements, the military
logistics system must be sized for the contingency of war. In practice military
logistics systems are sized somewhere between peacetime and wartime
requirements from peacetime cost considerations. Another difference between
logistics in the private sector and in the military is that, largely, the private
sector knows what and where its requirements arise. For the military some
requirements are predictable but others are less so: e.g., logistics to support
recent naval operations in the Persian Gulf or the British experience in the
Falklands war. One could set performance levels if requirements could be well
stated. However wartime requirements are scenario dependent and too costly to
provide for in peacetime. A quote from a recent Navy logistics workshop,
Ref(2), pertains:
Don't get bogged down by the fact that the logistics system today is a
pipeline without water; in peacetime we can never keep the pipeline full -
Congress will not allow us to do so. Let's design a good pipeline and see
that it will support future needs.
As to contracting for its logistics system components, the military does so to the
extent feasible, but one cannot contemplate Federal Express delivering ordnance
to a carrier battle force in the North Norwegian Sea in wartime.
C. NAVAL LOGISTICS
OPNAVINST 4000.85, Ref(3), defines naval logistics as consisting of three
parts: 1) acquisition logistics, 2) in-service support, and 3) operational logistics.
Acquisition logistics involves support systems (ILS and operational support
systems), commodities, facilities, and ordnance. In-service support includes the
Navy Supply System, maintenance, and bases and base operating support.
Operational logistics includes CONUS ports, strategic lift, in-theater support
services, shuttle lift, battle force/unit logistics, and operational logistics planning.
A subset of operational logistics is defined here as combat logistics. By combat
logistics is meant just fuel and ordnance stocks within a battle group, battle force,
or fleet in conflict. In terms of the OPNAV instruction, one might argue that
business logistics usually include only acquisition logistics and in-service support
and that there is no analogy of operational logistics in the private sector.
The purpose of the naval logistics system is to support the Maritime Strategy
which calls for forward deployment of the fleet in peacetime and fighting
forward in wartime. It is obvious that significant logistics are required if the
fleet is to go forward, remain there, and fight there if necessary. Beyond this,
the relationship between logistics and warfighting outcomes is not obvious.
The problem is one of MOEs that relate logistics to warfighting. In this
regard logistics is not so different from other non-kill aspects of modern warfare
like electronic warfare, command and control, intelligence, or even research and
development. All warfare support areas have the problem of being able to relate
directly and convincingly their contributions to warfare outcomes. In logistics a
few situations in which adequate MOEs might make a difference are as follows:
• The decision between buying a combat logistics force (CLF) station ship or
buying another combatant ship;
• The decision between buying advanced base functional components
(ABFCs) or buying a new weapon, platform or even manpower;
• The decision between buying stocks of ordnance or funding increased
flying hours and steaming days; and
• The decision to build the AOE-6 class CLF ship with less capability than
the AOE-1 class CLF ship.
No criticism of past decisions is implied or intended. What is being asserted
is that there is a need for MOEs for logistics that relate inputs for logistic
capabilities to outputs which are warfighting capabilities.
D. LOGISTICS MOES
In this section some measures of effectiveness used in in-service support
logistics and logistics planning models are discussed. The common theme of
these measures is that while they are in use currently, they generally relate
dollars spent on logistics resources to logistics output measures rather than to
warfighting outcomes. This is easy to note and criticize, but alternatives are not
offered at this time either.
1. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS FOR IN-SERVICE
SUPPORT
Three processes which are a part of in-service support are provisioning,
inventory control, and allowance list construction.
a. PROVISIONING
The Naval Supply System has a new provisioning model currently
being programmed at the Fleet Material Support Office as FD-PD 96,
Refs(4,5,6). Provisioning is the acquisition of an initial stock of spare parts for a
new equipment or system to satisfy demands from the date of initial operational
capability until the Supply System takes over replenishment responsibility
(typically 2-2.5 years).
Provisioning models attempt to allocate optimally a given
provisioning budget, where "allocate optimally" means deciding the range and
depth of spares to purchase so as to provide the best performance during the
provisioning period with respect to the chosen measure of effectiveness. Possible
measures of effectiveness include 1) units short, 2) requisitions short, 3) time-
weighted units or requisitions short, 4) essentiality-weighted units or requisitions
short, 5) mean supply response time, or 6) system availability. Of these
measures, system availability is the most attractive; it is the bottom line for the
operators of the system. The least attractive is units short which is equivalent to
saying "parts is parts" ala the fried chicken fast food commercial on TV; the
length of time for which the spare part is out of stock is of no consequence
either.
System or operational availability is defined as A :
A = MTBF/(MTBF + MTTR + MSRT)
where
MTBF = mean time between failures
MTTR = mean time to repair
MSRT = mean supply response time.
As attractive as A is conceptually, computing it for a real system requires
making an unsatisfactory number of simplifying assumptions. At this point
however note that A depends in part on mean supply response time. MSRT is in
turn equivalent to (a linear function of) time-weighted units short. Thus the
measure of effectiveness in the new Naval Supply System wholesale provisioning
model is the minimization of MSRT subject to the provisioning budget. The
budget - budgets really, one for consumable items and one for reparable items -
is determined from a separate model specified in DODINST 4140.42, Ref(7).
b. INVENTORY CONTROL
Mathematical inventory control theory dates from 1915 when F.W.
Harris developed the "economic order quantity" formula. In his formulation
Harris postulated that the relevent costs were those of ordering and holding stock
and the stockout cost incurred when there were shortages. The economic order
quantity is then derived as the order quantity which minimizes the sum of
ordering, holding, and shortage costs. There are numerous problems with this,
even today, popular formulation. Navy accounting systems are not structured to
produce estimates of any of these costs. Further, implicit in the formulation is
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the assumption that you can afford to buy an economic order quantity. In the
Navy monies for replenishment stock are appropriated by material cognizance
class, are always limited, and items within the class essentially compete with one
another for a share of the available dollars. Thus while the economic order
quantity is a single item, unconstrained optimization formulation, the real Navy
situation requires a multi-item constrained optimization.
When inventory control decision rules were computerized in the
Navy in the early 1960s, the economic order quantity formulation was employed
with the shortage cost being imputed from the procurement budget. This
approach necessarily applies the same shortage cost (Lagrange multiplier really)
to all items - "parts is parts" again. The shortcomings of this approach were
appreciated and in the early 1970s the nominal measure of effectiveness changed
from the minimization of variable costs to the minimization of mean supply
response time subject to the procurement budget constraint.
c. ALLOWANCE LISTS
While Navy provisioning and inventory models employ a
minimization of mean supply response time subject to the budget constraint
formulation, allowance lists construction employs no optimization model at all.
Allowance lists are compiled from the Fleet Logistics Support Improvement
Program procedure which, on an item by item basis, determines if the item
(spare part) will be on the list from either demand-frequency or insurance
criteria. If an item qualifies as demand-based, its depth is set so as to provide a
given level of protection against stockout for the relevent period of time. The
protection level is 90% and the time period is 90 days. Insurance items are items
which fail to qualify as demand-based, are thought to be critical nonetheless, and
are carried in minimum depth.
d. SUMMARY
The in-service support measures of effectiveness for provisioning,
inventory control, and allowance lists are related to service levels; minimize
mean supply response time or minimize the probability of stockout. These are
reasonable measures but they relate supply operations to supply measures (or
logistics measures). They do not relate supply operations to warfighting
outcomes. One can broadly sketch the chain of events from the successful
operation of the radar, fire control computer, launcher, and missile of a surface
conbatant that allowed it to kill an enemy antiship cruise missile in flight and
trace the successful operation of these systems back to the reliability inherent in
their design, to the adequacy of spare parts purchased, and to the training and
experience of the crew which diagnosed and repaired prior malfunctions.
However all of this is too overwhelming in magnitude, detail, and interactions to
be successfully modeled. Still decision makers in the Department of Defense and
the Congress want to know the answer to the question: "By how much will the
warfighting outcome be changed by another 50 million dollars spent for spare
parts?" Actually readiness is substituted for warfighting and "relating resources
to readiness" is the question studied. Multiple linear regression is the technique
most often employed to relate input resources to output readiness measures such
as full mission capable rate or days free of C3/C4 casualty reports. Data
problems abound in such analyses. See Ref(8) for example.
2. PLANNING MODELS FOR ACQUISITION LOGISTICS
Two planning models designed for use in connection with the
procurement of conventional ordnance are discussed. The first is a collection of
models known as NNOR, Non-Nuclear Ordnance Requirements. It is the model
currently used coincident with the annual Navy budgeting process. In FY 1983
the annual rate of expenditure on non-nuclear threat-oriented ordnance alone was
in excess of $3 billion.
Conventional ordnance is categorized as either 1) threat-oriented
ordnance or 2) level-of-effort ordnance. One report, Ref(9), describes threat-
oriented ordnance as that for which the need for weapons is determined mainly
by the number of targets and level-of-effort ordnance as those weapons for
which the need is determined by the number of shooters rather than targets. Air-
to-air missiles, surface-to-air missiles, and torpedoes are examples of threat
ordnance. Mk 82 bombs and sonobuoys are examples of level-of-effort
ordnance, though it is not clear to the author that these definitions are formal,
unambiguous, or uniformly interpreted.
NNOR encompasses both types of ordnance. For threat ordnance the
process begins by partitioning the types and numbers of enemy units into
ordnance types; i.e., the number of enemy bombers to be attrited by Phoenix air-
to-air missiles, etc. Having then determined the number of targets for each
weapon type the NNOR model calculates a set of ordnance requirements - the
number of each weapon required to make its apportioned kills with a high degree
of statistical confidence. This ends the NNOR methodology but a further step is
required; Navy budget programmers must decide how much of each ordnance
requirement to buy in the constrained budget. NNOR produces required
ordnance stocks and present stocks are normally below the 'requirements' levels.
The dollars needed to buy the deltas between present stocks and NNOR
requirements are enormous. Figure 1, as given in Ref(9), is applicable. Thus
each year Navy budget programmers are provided with updated requirements
and, using the requirements as a guide, decide how much ordnance procurement
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by ordnance type to procure within the constrained budget. In this last step they
are provided little if any analytical support.
Note that the NNOR methodology for ordnance requirements is
analogous in structure, but not in detail, to the Allowance List methodology
discussed previously in Section 4. A. 3. There is no cost constraint and no
optimization of any sort. In particular the methodology does not produce the





A Notional Five Year
Defense Program Profile
HISTORICAL PLANNED
81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91
Figure 1
The cost of any basket of ordnance procurements is easily computed. The
effectiveness of such procurements requires explicitly relating stocks of ordnance
types to the outcomes of naval warfare. This is left as an exercise for the Navy
budget programmers. Finally, getting back to the theme of this report, the
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measure of effectiveness in the NNOR model is statistical confidence that the
stock of a given type of ordnance is sufficient to kill a specified number of
enemy targets. Intuitively this is related to warfighting outcomes, but many
questions remain. Passing over the questions of whether threat partitioning is
appropriate and whether the requirements computations are valid, in a
constrained budget environment should the Navy buy X% of all the requirements
minus inventory deltas straight across the board or favor some ordnance types
over others? The NNOR methodology implicitly treats all ordnance types as
being of equal importance or effectiveness.
The Navy appreciated these concerns and others and, in 1981, asked the
Center for Naval Analyses to look into the matter. The Ordnance Programming
Model (OPM), Ref(lO), was the result and dealt only with threat ordnance types.
Quoting from Ref(lO):
For years the Navy has lacked a satisfactory methodology for
programming threat ordnance in the yearly budget review. Ordnance
'requirements' have been calculated without serious attention to how the
weapons are employed in combat, and there has been no framework to
compare various programs on the basis of their cost and effectiveness.
The OPM was meant to deal with cost and effectiveness, measuring
effectiveness by the contribution of ordnance stock levels to wartime naval
missions. It was intended that OPM would be used as follows. An analyst or
budget programmer would specify a worldwide scenario including the
disposition of U.S. and enemy forces, missions, engagements, weapon lethalities,
etc., etc. The analyst would then select a basket of desired ordnance stocks. How
to do this is unclear but presumably no ordnance stock level would be less than
the amount currently on hand and under contract. With this basket of ordnance
stocks, OPM would then evaluate the outcomes of the 'war' using a deterministic,
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expected value computation scheme. Outcomes are expressed as the numbers of
U.S. and enemy losses of ships, submarines, and aircraft as a function of time.
Performing this exercise with the present stocks of threat ordnance and
again with unlimited amounts of threat ordnance would give lower and upper
bounds on effectiveness. Other baskets of ordnance stocks could then be
postulated, costed and evaluated as to their effectiveness. How to uniquely
determine the effectiveness of a given basket of ordnance stocks when there are
multiple output measures was not specified. OPM was essentially a deterministic
simulation which, by itself, optimized nothing. Still one is sympathetic with the
developers who recognized the necessity of trying to relate logistics expenditures
(on threat ordnance in this case) to warfare outcomes.
NNOR has been around for a very long time and is still 'the' model
which provides the Navy's baseline ordnance requirements. As far as is known
OPM is dead. Still NNOR is not without its critics and among them was the
former Secretary of the Navy, John Lehman, who wrote in the Armed Forces
Journal (1983),
It took us the first full year of the Administration to turn around the
totally unrealistic peacetime planning models that the analytical community
had foisted on the operators. You could only buy two torpedoes for every
target in the Soviet fleet that was worth a torpedo, because you had, say, a
55% or 65% kill probability, and so two gave you over 100% and,
therefore, you could not buy any more. That's the situation we were in; it
was totally unrealistic.
E. BATTLE GROUP LOGISTICS
1. BACKGROUND
The following brief historical summary borrows heavily from a splendid
paper by Miller, et al, Ref (11). Replenishment at sea came into being when
coaling at sea became a priority matter in 1898 in connection with the blockade
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of the Spanish fleet at Santiago. Nineteen years later LT Chester Nimitz was
project officer, engineering officer, and executive officer of the Navy's second
fleet oiler and worked out a jury rig for the underway fueling of destroyers
transiting the North Atlantic in World War I. Twenty-one years after this,
RADM Nimitz was developing a method for refueling aircraft carriers at sea and
wanted to determine the maximum speed at which underway station keeping
could be established and maintained. A heavy cruiser was used to simulate a
high-speed replenishment ship and the receiving ship was a destroyer commanded
by LCDR Arleigh Burke. Numerous trials conducted at ever increasing speeds
resulted in successful approach and station keeping for underway replenishment
(unrep) at up to 28 knots.
Until the last six months of World War II replenishment in the Pacific
was largely conducted in port at an advanced base to which merchant ships
brought fuel, ordnance and stores from CONUS. In planning the Iwo Jima and
Okinawa campaigns, Admiral Raymond Spruance was directed to conduct
intensive air strikes against the Japanese home islands. Aircraft could expend
their aircraft carrier's ordnance magazines in 2-4 days and the nearest advanced
base at that time was 2000 miles away. Returning to base, rearming, and
steaming back to station off Japan would take 10-12 days, yielding an on-
station/off-station ratio of about 30%. Consequently Spruance directed his staff
to develop a method to rearm at sea. The first ordnance replenishment at sea
occurred in February, 1945. The ability to replenish fuel and ordnance at sea
meant that two days of air strikes required only two nights and a day out of
combat to replenish; replenishment occurred after withdrawal to just outside
Japanese aircraft range. Fleet Admiral Nimitz declared underway replenishment
to be the Navy's secret weapon of World War II.
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All World War II replenishment ships were single product ships and thus
a combatant was required to unrep separately with an oiler, ammo ship, and
stores ship. In 1952 a German oiler which had become a war prize was
commissioned and used to evaluate the utility of a multi-product replenishment
ship. The German ship, though an oiler, also had cargo holds for ordnance and
stores. This ship's performance with the Sixth Fleet in 1954 made a convincing
case for a replenishment ship that could simultaneously transfer fuel, ordnance
and stores. The last step in this brief history of underway replenishment as we
know it today occurred in a 1957 conference called by the then-CNO, Admiral
Arleigh Burke. It was from this conference that the modern AOE class multi-
product unrep ship was conceived as bigger, faster, more capable, and cheaper to
build and operate than the oiler+ammunition+stores combination of ships it
would replace. The extent to which top Navy leadership played key operational
and decision-making roles, in wartime and in peacetime, in the development of
the Navy's formidable unrep capability is remarkable.
Today combat logistics force (CLF) ships bring fuel, ordnance, spare
parts, and subsistence commodities to deployed battle groups allowing them to
stay on station and to conduct continuous operations there. There are presently
57 CLF ships in the Navy representing two classes of multi-product ships and
single product oilers (AO), ammunition ships (AE), and stores ships (AFS). See
Table 1. The concept of operations includes a "station ship" or ships which
remain with the battle group, and "shuttle ships" that transit from an advanced
base to the battle group to replenish the station ship. The AOE and AOR class
multi-product ships serve as station ships and the AO, T-AO, AE, AFS, and T-
AFS classes of ships serve as shuttle ships, though the single-product ships can
and are used as station ships at times.
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AOE 1 53,000 26 177K 2150 750 4 21 (1)
AOR 1 37,000 20 175K 600 575 7 18
AO 177 26,000 20 120K 5 7
AO 51 34,000 18 185K 3 45
T-AO 187 40,000 20 180K 4 2 (2)
T-AO 143 27,000 20 180K 6 34
T-AO 105 35,000 16 150K 5 43
AE 26 18,000 20 1700 8 19 (3)
AE 21 16,000 18 1500 5 31
AFS 1 18,000 20 3925 7 22
T-AF8 16,000 16 1413 1 34
T-AFS 8 16,000 18 2893 3 22
Notes:
(1) Four new ships, the AOE 6 class, are planned and the first is under construction.
(2) A total of 18 ships of this class are planned.
(3) The AE 36 class is planned but, through FY 1991, is as yet unbudgeted. Note that
the average age of the ships in the Combat Logistics Force is 24 years.
2. REPLENISHMENT TIME AND TIME OFF STATION
Since the CLF is in being, no one compares having it with not having it
and having to steam back to a base to replenish. There are questions about
whether the CLF numbers and characteristics are adequate, but these are not
considered here. Within the battle group, measures of effectiveness for
underway replenishment relate in part to Admiral Burke's observation that time
spend in replenishment is time lost to the mission of the battle group. Two
common measures are time spent in unrep and time off station. The time spent in
unrep depends on what is needed by the combatant and the number of unrep
stations on the combatant. Fuel transfer rates between all CLF ships and all
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(2) A total of 18 ships of this class are planned.
(3) The AE 36 class is planned but, through FY 1991, is as yet unbudgeted. Note that
the average age of the ships in the Combat Logistics Force is 24 years.
2. REPLENISHMENT TIME AND TIME OFF STATION
Since the CLF is in being, no one compares having it with not having it and
having to steam back to a base to replenish. There are questions about whether
the CLF numbers and characteristics are adequate, but these are not considered
here. Within the battle group, measures of effectiveness for underway
replenishment relate in part to Admiral Burke's observation that time spend in
replenishment is time lost to the mission of the battle group. Two common
measures are time spent in unrep and time off station. The time spent in unrep
depends on what is needed by the combatant and the number of unrep stations on
the combatant. Fuel transfer rates between all CLF ships and all combatants are
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standardized at 3000 gallons per minute. The actual rate of fuel transfer depends
on the number of fueling stations on the unrep ship and the receiving ship.
Ordnance and stores transfer rates depend upon the number of unrep stations on
the unrep ship and the receiving ship and whether the receiving combatant ship
has limited receiving areas and/or limiting strikedown rates. The transfer rate of
missiles to combatants is one instance where the combatant's receiving/holding
area and strikedown rate may drive the unrep time.
Thus the main determinants of unrep time are optempo and combatant
ship characteristics. CLF characteristics seem less important with two important
qualifications. The AOE is the most capable ship in the CLF with more cargo
transfer stations than any other unrep ship. The AOR has limited ordnance
capacity but this can be ameliorated by using an AOR and an AE in combination
as station ships. The other qualification is that when the station ship is not a
multi-product ship the combatant may have to unrep from more than one CLF
ship depending on its needs. This, of course, will increase total unrep time.
Thus it is being argued that, except for the two qualifications, total unrep time is
not a great measure of effectiveness for battle group replenishment because it
depends only weakly on unrep ship characteristics or operations. However if
there was a proposal to reengineer the whole fleet, CLF and combatants alike, to
increase fuel transfer rates or cargo transfer weights, the above conclusion would
be invalid.
Total time off station is more interesting. Each combatant in the battle
group is given a station in the formation based upon its warfare capability(s); i.e.
AAW or ASW. At the opposite ends of the spectrum of methods of replenishing
combatants steaming in a formation are the "delivery boy" scheme in which the
station ship travels to the combatant and the "gas station" scheme in which the
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combatants come to the station ship. Because each combatant at its assigned
station contributes something to the overall defensive screen of the battle group,
a combatant off station for unrep degrades the screen. Hence the desire to
minimize time off station. It follows that the delivery boy scheme is superior to
the gas station scheme in minimizing combatant time off station. However the
combatant will likely have some time off station even with delivery boy because
the limited speed during unrep may be less than the battle group speed of advance
(SOA). Further battle group formations which are greatly dispersed can, at some
point, make delivery boy infeasible. An AOE station ship is considerably faster
than an AOR station ship and this can become important in highly dispersed
formations with a relatively high SOA. At an SOA greater than 20 knots the
AOR is not a viable station ship because it can not keep up with the formation let
alone act as a delivery boy. However an SOA of greater than 20 knots is likely to
be incompatible with air operations and thus infeasible anyhow.
The use of time off station as a measure of effectiveness for battle group
replenishment is motivated by the desire to maintain the defensive integrity of the
formation. The other side of this coin is the vulnerability of the station ship
which must itself be considered a high value asset. A battle group which loses its
station ship has very little sustainability until it can be reached by new CLF ships
or returns to port. Clearly the combat power of a battle group can be crippled
by the loss of the CLF station ship. For this reason combatant time off station
must be offset by a characterization of the vulnerability of the station ship and
used in combination to be a satisfactory measure of unrep effectiveness.
It is proposed that deployed battle groups may be thought of as being in
one of three states: in transit, in MODLOC, or in combat. Transit and MODLOC
are characterized as low or medium threat environments. Combat is in a high
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threat environment; e.g., wartime operations inside the Soviet sea-denial zone.
Transit is characterized by SOAs of 15-20 knots. In peacetime delivery boy
unrep in transit is feasible with an AOE station ship. Wartime transit probably
precludes delivery boy unrep due to SOA and vulnerability of the station ship.
MODLOC operations are characterized by very modest unit speeds in a relatively
low threat area. Delivery boy unrep works here. In combat, wartime by
definition, one would hope to avoid the need to unrep at all and to have planned
the tactics and battle group logistics in such a way that the battle group is self
sufficient until it can withdraw from the high threat area. The station ship would
accompany the battle group into combat for the flexibility and sustainability it
represents to the battle group. Unrep of fuel may be avoidable with good
planning but ordnance may be required between enemy raids. If so gas station
offers the capability of rearming two combatants at once, each both by connected
underway replenishment and by vertical replenishment, maximizing the amount
of rearming possible in the (unknown) time until the next raid arrives. Gas
station also provides the best protection for the station ship while operating in a
high threat area.
3. MINIMUM LEVELS
A third battle group measure of effectiveness has to do with the
minimum levels of combat logistics commodities experienced by units in the
battle group. If a ship has a propulsion fuel (F-76) capacity of F mgals
(thousands of gallons) and command has set a reserve level of, say, 60%, it is
intended that the F-76 quantity should never fall below .6F. The time between
unreps of F-76 will depend on F and the rate of consumption. The number of
days from top-off until the fuel on board reaches .6F is T = .4F/24f, where f is
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the consumption rate in mgals per hour. Typical values for T are 3-7 days or
longer depending on the ship type and its speed in knots.
Whether the combat logistics commodity is propulsion fuel, aviation
fuel, specific ordnance types, or something else, the minimum levels will be the
reserve levels or higher so long as underway replenishment can be conducted as
required. Unrep can be conducted as required so long as it is not precluded by
enemy or own operations, so long as there is a station ship, and so long as there
are sufficient quantities in the station ship. An AOE can refuel (from 60% back
to 100%) a conventional carrier battle group about 2.3 times. At this point the
station ship needs to "consol," to consolidate its remaining fuel load with what it
can take from a shuttle ship. The AO 177 class oiler, potentially either a shuttle
ship or a station ship, is described as having been sized to provide two refuelings
for a conventional carrier battle group. Though propulsion fuel has been
discussed, the same situation holds for any combat logistics commodity. Thus the
minimum levels will be the reserve levels or greater provided there is a station
ship, provided there are sufficient timely visits by shuttle ships, and provided
there is enough of the various commodities to refill the shuttle ships as required.
Loss of the station ship, shuttle ships, or stocks at an advanced base due to enemy
action would necessitate the withdrawal of the battle group from combat until the
losses can be made up. Minimum levels as a measure of effectiveness is useful in
looking at the adequacy of a logistics support plan which specifies the numbers of
each type of shuttle ship that will be available.
There are three recent, computer-based models that seek to analyze
battle force logistics in terms of some or all of the following measures: the
amount of material expended and replenished during an operation, the number
and mix of CLF ships needed to support an operation, and the delivery methods
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used by CLF station ships. The models are the Replenishment-At-Sea Model
(RASM), Ref(12), the Battle Force Operations Requirement Model (BFORM),
Ref(13), and the Resupply Sealift Requirements Generator/Ship On-Line
Scheduler (RSRG/SOS), Refs(14) and (15).
The BFORM model provides data on minimum levels experienced
during a battle force operation. BFORM and RASM provide combatant time off-
station statistics. RSRG/SOS does not provide output related to individual ships,
but will examine the adequacy of a logistics support plan quite readily. Other
battle force measures of effectiveness can be computed if one is willing to trace
through lengthy event lists output by the models.
4. SUSTAINABILITY
The sustainability of a battle group is conceptually attractive as the
ultimate measure of logistics effectiveness because it depends on all three parts of
the Navy logistics system: acquisition, in-service support, and operational
logistics. In terms of combat logistics commodities the following definitions of
sustainability are offered. Ship propulsion fuel, F-76, is most usefully
characterized in days of steaming. If at a given time the quantity of F-76 in a
combatant is 84% of capacity, the sustainability it represents is (.84-.60)F/24f
days, where f is the burn rate in mgals per hour for that ship at a given speed in
knots. For example let's say a Leahy class cruiser has an F-76 capacity of
450,000 gallons and will burn 1092 gallons per hour at 15 knots. If the current
F-76 level is 84% of capacity and if the reserve level is 60%, then the ship has a
current F-76 sustainability of 4.12 days at 15 knots.
Aviation fuel, JP-5, is used in fixed wing and rotary wing aircraft and
can be used for ship propulsion fuel if necessary. How should sustainability be
measured for JP-5? In the absence of a specific threat or a specific offensive
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action by the battle group, there is a normal amount of flying done to maintain a
defensive posture (CAP, early warning, ASW) and training and maintenance
flying on a daily basis. This flying can be characterized in terms of the numbers
of specific aircraft types and their number of sorties per day. Using the number
of gallons of JP-5 required per sortie it is easy to compute the total amount of
JP-5 that will be consumed per day for normal flight operations. It would then
be prudent to reserve a quantity of JP-5 for some number of days of normal
flying, say, 3 days (adequate to withdraw from a high threat area if necessary).
On top of normal flying requirements are requirements for specific
offensive or defensive events; i.e., strikes or defense against enemy raids. Again
characterize the strike or raid events in terms of the types and numbers of
aircraft, including tankers if appropriate, and determine the total number of
gallons of JP-5 used by a strike or raid. In the models used by the author these
totals are roughly equal. Thus one might characterize the JP-5 sustainability of
the aircraft carrier at a given time by first reserving X days worth of JP-5 for
normal flight operations and describing the balance in terms of the number of
strikes or raids that quantity represents. For example let's say a carrier has a JP-
5 capacity of 1500 mgals. If 3 days of normal flying in a high threat area
requires 600 mgals, if the current JP-5 fuel state is 1 100 mgals, and if a raid or
strike requires 100 mgals, then the JP-5 sustainability at that time is 5 raids or
strikes. JP-5 unrep to the carrier could be triggered by a percent reserve
criterion or by sustainability measured in raids or strikes criterion. No mention
has been made of the JP-5 requirements of surface combatants for ASW helo
operations. In total the surface combatants hold only 6% of the battle group's JP-
5 total capacity and each combatant has enough JP-5 for a relatively large
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number of helicopter sorties. Thus surface combatant JP-5 requirements are not
likely to drive battle group logistics requirements.
The situation with ordnance sustainability is somewhat analogous to JP-5.
Threat-oriented ordnance usage is probably related to specific events such as
raids, strikes or ASW prosecutions. For some ordnance types, sonobuoys for
example, usage can probably be reckoned in terms of days (of operations at sea).
For surface combatants which are AAW missile shooters, standard missile
sustainability should be characterized in terms of the number of raids which
could be engaged; i.e., 0,1,2,... depending on the magazine quantity on hand and
the expected raid size. Similarly anti-ship cruise missile sustainability would be
characterized as representing 0,1,2,... strikes depending on the weapon load
remaining and target type. One difference between ordnance and fuel is that
where unrep of fuels is routine, some ordnance types are difficult to unrep at sea
(very slow rates) and some threat ordnance types are not planned for unrep at
sea; i.e., long range antiship missiles. In the case of the latter, sustainability can
not be restored except by returning to port.
It is suggested that the use of "number of raids" or "number of strikes"
is more meaningful than days of supply. The notion of days of supply is
acceptable for food, propulsion fuel, and some ordnance, but is not the most
appropriate for commodities whose usage is dictated by events rather than just
the passage of time. The temptation to convert from raids or strikes to kill of
enemy ships, aircraft, or facilities is resisted because the conversion would
necessarily involve additional models and assumptions. In characterizing
standard missile stocks in terms of the number of raids, the outcome of the
enemy raid is not predicted. Rather the sustainability measure is just the number
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of raids for which there are sufficient missiles on hand to legitimately engage the
enemy.
Obviously battle group sustainability in combat logistics commodities
depends in the first instance on the station ship and its survival. Next in the
support chain are the shuttle ships, the adequacy of their numbers for the forces
to be supported and the transit distances involved, and their survival and that of
their cargos. Just behind the shuttle ships are the advanced bases they will
operate from. Continental US ports are the fallback if advanced bases are not
available or denied to us, but shuttle ship transits would be longer effectively
increasing the number of shuttle ships and escorts required.
a. Fleet Logistics Sustainability Assessment
A major fleet logistics sustainability assessment was undertaken
within the last year. In a marvelously complete and thorough analysis the
situation with regard to various items representing logistics resources was
assessed and characterized. Generally the baseline requirements were derived
from the logistics resources necessary to successfully execute a given operations
plan (OPLAN). The measure of effectiveness was usually the percent of the
requirement that was available at the time of the assessment. Depending upon the
percentage of the requirement available a rating of SI, S2, S3, or S4 was assigned
with SI interpreted as good and S4 as bad. The analysis considered over 100
separate categories of logistics resources from fuels and ordnance types to
facilities, transportation assets and personnel.
The assessment was undertaken to characterize logistical readiness to
execute a given OPLAN and to support budget formulation. The cost of
correcting deficiencies could easily be computed. Various levels of funding
could be considered such as the cost of bringing all categories of logistics
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resources up to 100% of the requirement, to 90% of the requirement, etc. The
approach used in the fleet logistics sustainability assessment presumes that there is
a rigorous, accurate methodology for determining requirements. If we take this
as a given, there is still the problem of assessing the risk or criticality of being at
only a reduced percent of requirement in each of the logistics resource
categories.
In other words while the cost of correcting the perceived
deficiencies is easily determined, the benefit from spending this money or the
risk associated with not spending the money are not addressed and are unclear.
The percent of requirement met by available assets is essentially a "logistics
measure;" dollars input to buy logistics resources are related to the logistics
output measure which is "percent of requirement met."
The problem is that the Navy, Defense planner, or member of
Congress is not provided with a feeling for the most critical problems to fix with
a limited budget. Critical here refers to the ability of the fleet to execute the
OPLAN. Just as all items are not equally expensive, so also all items are unlikely
to be equally important to the successful execution of the OPLAN. The fleet
logistics sustainability assessment however implicitly treats all requirement
shortfalls as equally important. The decision maker really needs to know the
contribution of each type of logistics resource.
One approach to determining the criticality or relative importance
of individual types of logistics resources to OPLAN execution is to quantify the
judgements of knowledgeable persons who are asked to compare the items. This
approach was taken in a recent Naval Postgraduate School thesis, Ref(16), which
sought to prioritize advanced base functional components (ABFCs). A
reasonably large number of knowledgeable officers were asked to make
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categorical judgements and pairwise comparisons on a reduced set of the most
important ABFCs. There are over 200 ABFCs and annually the Fleet
Commanders-in-Chief (FLTCINC) are asked to list the 30 ABFCs most critical to
their theater and OPLANS. In Ref(16) the eleven ABFCs most frequently
mentioned in the June 1987 FLTCINC reports were used in the study. Two
survey instruments designed to elicit categorical judgements and pairwise
comparisons were sent to 24 knowledgeable officers. They were asked in each
case to make judgements as to the importance of each ABFC to the successful
execution of a general OPLAN, a "base case." Categorical data was obtained by
asking the subject experts to place each of the ABFCs into one of four categories
ranging from "no effect" on OPLAN execution to "war stopping." These
categorical judgements were then used to establish an interval scale, Ref(17).
Figure 2 shows the interval scale of the relative importance of each of the eleven
ABFCs.
In the second survey instrument the experts were asked to make
pairwise comparisons of all pairs of ABFCs and give for each an "intensity
value" ranging from "equal importance" to "absolute importance" of one ABFC
over the other. These comparisons were then analyzed using both the Constant
Sum Method, Ref(18), and Saaty's Analytical Hierarchy Process, Ref(19).
Though the numerical scale values are different, the rankings produced by these
two methods are identical. Figure 3 shows the ranking and scale produced by the
Constant Sum Method. Finally, the agreement between the categorical and
pairwise responses is quite good as comparing Figures 2 and 3 indicates. The
respondents found the categorical response survey easier than the pairwise
comparison survey and of course the number of items that can be considered in
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asking for pairwise comparisons is limited since the number of comparisons is
n(n-l)/2, where n is the number of items being considered.
1 k DETRIMENT TO MISSION IF ABFC LOST




— Cargo Handling Battalion
S 0.5-
O — Naval Overseas Air Cargo Terminal
5
on — Naval Station Communication (AMCC Van)
— Aviation Tank Farm
Tank Farm
0.0-
. High Speed Fuel Dispensing System
> P-3C Intermediate Support Facility
— P-3A/B Intermediate Support FacilityiW
-0 5—Q
2




Figure 2. Scale Obtained using Categorical Judgments
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F. CONCLUSION
In the section on Sustainability the author introduced the idea of
characterizing the state of combat logistics commodities in a battle group in
terms of days of endurance or the number of events (strikes or raid defense) the
battle group could legitimately undertake. These measures are not measures of
effectiveness so much as they are a taxonomy for battle group logistics decision
aids. Still they relate logistics resources to warfighting and thus seem to be a step
in the right direction.
The other idea presented in that section was that of using expert judgements
to obtain utility scales representing the relative worth of one subcategory of
logistics resource compared to the others in that category. To be responsive to
the needs of defense planners this process would have to be expanded to where it
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considered the various categories of logistics resources (ABFCs vs. ordnance
stocks vs. CLF ships, etc.), and logistics resources against other forms of defense
expenditure (personnel, training, ships, aircraft, steaming days, weapon systems,
R&D, etc.). This seems to be an unrealistically large undertaking however, even
if one has no reservations about using expert judgements for decision making.
Thus this report has focused on measures of effectiveness in logistics and the
central theme has been that, at best, dollars spent on logistics resources can today
only be related to logistics output measures. One would like to be able to
characterize logistics dollars spent in terms of their contribution to warfighting
outcomes. Without this ability, logistics will be relatively low priority and the
logistics system will be funded at levels which are adequate in the main to
meeting only peacetime requirements.
In the event of conflict, all uncertainties with regard to how logistics relate to
warfighting outcomes will resolve themselves fairly rapidly. The only problem
is that the pace of the conflict may not allow sufficient time for the acquisition of
the logistics resources required. The Falkland Islands conflict lasted only 73
days yet the British expended ordnance against real and false targets at such rates
that shortages of some types of ordnance were experienced. These shortages
could of course not be made up during the conflict and the British were forced to
use ordnance stocks earmarked for NATO contingencies, Ref(20).
The issues in developing meaningful logistics measures of effectiveness are
clear. How to proceed is unfortunately unclear. In the absence of operational
measures of effectiveness for logistics, Navy budget planners and decision
makers in DOD and the Congress are left with difficult tasks. They must decide
"how much logistics in enough" without much help from analysis.
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